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MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF AN
ALTERNATIVE CONTRACT.
Zalis v. Walter'

The evidence in this case, as summarized by the Court
of Appeals, was about as follows. The plaintiff entered
into an agreement with the defendant in 1924 by which
the plaintiff was to install his sewing machines in the defendant's building. The plaintiff was to work for the
defendant and to keep the machines in repair. Whenever
the relationship was severed, the machines were to be returned to the plaintiff in the same condition as when
put in the building or the defendant was to pay a fair
market price for them. The plaintiff stopped working for
the defendant on February 8th or 9th, 1939. In conversation on February 15th, 1939, the plaintiff offered to save
further disagreement by taking $1,500 for his machines.
This was refused by the defendant who offered $1,000,
which was refused. There was no suggestion of a demand
for, or an offer of the return of the machines.
The plaintiff was suing under a declaration containing
the common counts and a special count to the effect that
the plaintiff sold and delivered to the defendant a lot
of sewing machines on or about the 15th of February 1939,
alleging the specific value of the machines at $3,367.50,
which the defendant had failed to pay. There was a bill
of particulars identifying the machines as set forth in
an earlier written schedule and giving credit for several
sold at an earlier date. The defendant pleaded the general
issue. At the trial, a verdict for the plaintiff for $3,000
was returned by the jury. The case was appealed upon
certain objections to the evidence and the denial of all
of the defendant's prayers including a variance prayer,
proper in form, which insisted that the evidence did not
support the declaration. The Court of Appeals reversed
without a new trial, ruling that the evidence did not
support the contract alleged in the declaration and that
the variance prayer should have been granted and the
case withheld from the jury.
The Court of Appeals indicated that the evidence might
have supported under appropriate pleadings a recovery
of damages for breach of an alternative contract. In doing
this, the Court approved for the first time the rule of
1 180

Md. 120, 23 A. (2d) 26 (1941).
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damages for breach of alternative contract and cast some
doubt upon the ground of an earlier decision which had
shied off from the application of the rule. The Court
quoted with approval from the Restatement of Contracts:
"The damages for breach of an alternative contract are
determined in accordance with that one of the alternatives
that is chosen by the party having an election, or in case
of a breach without an election, in accordance with the
alternative that will result in the smallest recovery."2
The theory of the authorities applying this rule that
the measure of damages is the value of the alternative least
onerous to the promisor is that such alternative is the
one the promisor would have been most likely to perform
had he not defaulted; and that it is not proper for the
court to rewrite contracts for the parties, as would in
effect result if the right to elect were shifted from the
promisor to the promisee upon the promisor's failure to
perform unless so provided in the contract.3
A minority group of cases follows the theory that the
measure of damages should be based on that alternative
4
selected by the promisee, after the promisor's default.
It is argued in support of this theory that the promisor,
being at fault, should not be heard to complain that he
is made to perform the most onerous of several alternative
acts. It is because of the promisor's breach of such agreement that the promisee has suffered an unprovided for
loss and it is not unfair for him to receive more than
he otherwise would. 5 This measure of damages seems to
2

RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) Sec. 344. See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
(1937) See. 1407; 17 C. J. S. 935; Branhill Realty Co. v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 60 F. (2d) 922 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1932) ; Prudential Ins. Co. of America
v. Faulkner, 68 F. (2d) 676 (C. C. A. 10th, 1934); W. J. Holliday & Co. v.
Highland Iron & Steel Co., 43 Ind. App. 342, 87 N. E. 249 (1909) ; Franklin
Sugar Ref. Co. v. Howell, 274 Pa. 190, 118 A. 109 (1922) ; In Re People, by
Beha, 255 N. Y. 428, 175 N. E. 118 (1931).
1 Ibid. Also, Pennsylvania Re-treading Tire Co. v. Goldberg, 305 IlI. 54,
137 N. E. 81 (1922), noted (1923) 32 Yale L. J. 618; Phillips v. Cornelius,
28 S. 871 (Miss., 1900), criticized (1901) 14 Harv. L. Rev. 613.
'Washoma Petroleum Co. v. Eason Oil Co., 49 P. (2nd) 709 (Okla.,
1935) ; Virginia Export Coal Co. v. Rowland Land Co., 100 W. Va. 559, 131
S. E. 253 (1926) ; Kramer v. Ewing, 10 Okla. 357 (1904); Coles v. Peck,
96 Ind. 333 (1884) ; Corbin v. Fairbanks, Barlow & Co., 56 Vt. 538 (1884) ;
Patchin v. Swift, 21 Vt. 292 (1849) ; 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1937) 392,
Sec. 1407.
5 Professor Williston says that this is an erroneous rule laid down in a
few cases relying on a passage from Coke's Littleton relating to grants
rather than to contracts. "The feoffee by his act and wrong may lose his
election and give the same to the feoffor. As if one infeoffe another of the
two acres, to have and to hold the one for life and the other in talle, and
he before election maketh a feoffment of both; in this case, the feoffor
shall enter into which of them he will, for the act and wrong of the
foeffee." 5 WLnisToN, CONTACTS (1937) Sec. 1407, n. 14.
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be of the punitive type instead of the compensatory type
which is generally followed. The general purpose of the
rule of damages as laid down for breach of contract is to
place the promisee in as good a position as he would have
been in if the contract had been performed. Williston says,
"In fixing the amount of damages, the general purpose
of the law is, and should be, to give compensation, that is,
to put the plaintiff in as good a position as he would have
been in had the defendant kept his contract."6
Where the promise is to do one or the other of certain
acts in the alternative, the promisor is bound to perform
in one of the methods specified, and having the election,
he can be charged with a breach only when he refuses to
perform either.7 Thus only on the exercise of the right
of election as to which alternative is to be performed does
the obligation become absolute and determinable . Until
the alternative is chosen, the contract is indefinite by its
terms in so far as the promisee is concerned. He has
expressly entered into this type of contract whereby the
promisor has a right to chose that performance which
will be the least burdensome to him at the time of performance. Since both parties may agree to any terms
of a contract which is not illegal or against public policy,
the promisee cannot complain that he may not know which
alternative will be performed at the time the contract was
made. This results from his own agreement to be satisfied by performance of the promisor's choice when it falls
due.
Since the alternative contract gives the promisor the
right to choose that performance which is the least burdensome to him when performance is due, the right to
elect which of the alternatives should be chosen as the
alternative to be considered breached, and as the obligation
from which the measure of damages be calculated, should
not pass to the promisee. The parties do not agree that
when there is a total failure of performance the promisee
should specify the alternative breached. The maximum
legal right that belongs to the promisee is to have the
a WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1937) Sec. 1338; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) Sec. 329.
7 Brocton Olympia Realty Co. v. Lee, 266 Mass. 550, 165 N. E. 873, 876
(1929) ; Salant v. Fox, 271 F. 449 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1921); 13 C. J. 629-30,
Contracts, Sec. 697.
8Noyes and another v. Cooper, 5 Leigh 186 (Va., 1834) ; Blake v. Paramount Pictures, 22 Fed. Supp. 249 (D. C. S. D. Cal., 1938); Standard Appliance Co. v. Standard Equipment Co., 296 F. 456 (C. C. A. 6th, 1924) ; Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America v. Greenspan Bros. Co., 108 N. J. L. 115,
156 A. 425 (1931) ; 13 C. J. 629-30, Contracts, Sec. 697.

1943]

ZALIS v. WALTER

alternative performed which would be chosen by the promisor if he did perform, which in all probability would
be that one least onerous to him. From this the courts
should presume that the alternative breached where there
is a total failure of performance is that alternative which
will result in the smallest amount of damages recoverable
by the promisee. This would be in accordance with the
intention of the parties at the time the contract was made
and would merely put the promisee in the very same position as if the contract had been performed. For the Court
to do otherwise would have the effect of rewriting the
contract of the parties in disregard of their intention when
the contract was entered into. The promisor should have
the right to come into court and insist that the damages
be limited so as to conform with the intent of the parties
and the terms of the contract, inasmuch as the rights of
the promisee under the contract are so limited.
Maryland, in the dicta in Zalis v. Walter,9 adopts the
view of the Restatement of Contracts and that followed
by the majority of the courts, namely, that where there
is a breach of an alternative contract, in the absence of a
stipulation to the contrary, the right to elect does not pass
to the promisee but remains with the promisor, and that
the measure of damages is based on that alternative which
the promisor would have chosen had he performed the
alternative which is the least burdensome to him.
It is to be noted in passing that as soon as the promisor
has made an election as to which alternative he will perform, ° the obligation to perform that alternative becomes
final" and the measure of damages
for the breach is based
12
upon the chosen alternative.
In an earlier Maryland case, Wheeling Steel & Iron Co.
v. Williams, 3 the plaintiff company, in reply to an inquiry
from the defendant, offered to sell one hundred tons of
tack plate rolled into four different gauges at designated
prices for the different sizes. The defendant replied:
"Enter our order for one hundred tons tack plate at price
Supra, circa n. 2.
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932)
Sec. 344; Cocklin v. Home Mut. Ins.
Assn., 204 Iowa 4, 222 N. W. 368 (1928) : Paro v. St. Martin, 180 Mass. 29,
61 N. ER. 268 (1901) ; Morrell v. Irving F. Ins. Co., 33 N. Y. 429 (1865)
Dimmick v. Banning Cooper & Co., 256 Pa. 295, 100 A. 871 (1917).
"RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS (1932)
See 325(b).
12 Welsh v. Welsh's Estate, 148 Minn. 235, 181 N. W. 356 (1921), noted
(1921) 7 Cornell L. Q. 51; Pearson v. William's Adm'rs, 24 Wend. 244
(N. Y., 1840) ; Russell v. Wright, 23 S. D. 338, 121 N. W. 842 (1909); 5
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1937) Sec. 1407.
1097 Md. 305, 55 A. 373 (1903).
10
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quoted, specifications to follow." To this plaintiff replied:
"We have . . . entered your order for 100 tons of tack
plate at prices quoted by us. . ." The defendant refused
to give any directions as to the sizes required. The Court
held that the plaintiff could not recover because no definite and complete contract had been made since the defendant reserved the right to designate subsequently what
particular sizes of tack plate he would take. It was reasoned that the words of the acceptance, "specifications to
follow", left something essential for future action to be
designated by the purchaser and therefore constituted a
new and independent offer requiring an acceptance by
the vendor. 4
The offer of the plaintiff designated four different
gauges at different prices from which the defendant could
chose. Two of the gauges were priced at $2.72 per hundred
pounds and two at $2.80 per hundred pounds. The Court,
after deciding that the contract was void said:
"The test of this (indefiniteness) lies in considering what would have been the measure of damages
in a suit instituted by the vendor against the vendee
for breach of the alleged contract. Would the vendor
have been entitled to recover the difference between
the contract price and the market price of the whole
one hundred tons, reckoned on the basis of $2.80 per
hundred pounds; or on the basis of $2.72 per hundred
pounds or on some other basis founded on an arbitrary
apportionment of the whole number of tons amongst
the four different gauges? And would not the difficulty of fixing a correct measure of damage have
sensibly increased if the market price of the four
gauges had fallen in an unequal ration and in different rates of percentage? What quantity of each gauge
could a Court or jury declare that the vendee ought
to have specified? If either Court or jury had undertaken such a task it would have supplied a term of
the contract which the parties themselves failed to
incorporate, and manifestly such a proceeding would
have been unwarranted."' 5
The Court seemed to think it was impossible to estimate
the damages in an alternative contract and so, to avoid
1 For a discussion of the problem as to a contract of sale which calls for
a definite quantity but leaves the quality, grade, or assortment optional with
one of the parties, as subject to objection of indefiniteness, see Note (1937)
106 A. L. R. 1284.
15Wheeling Steel Co. v. Evans, 97 Md. 305, 312, 55 A. 373 (1903).
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that difficulty, it proceeded to hold-in what seems a ques16
tionable decision-that there was no contract at all.
Under the majority rule discussed above, and approved
in Zalis v. Walter,'1 7 the measure of damages could have
been calculated on the basis of a contract calling for one
hundred pounds of tack at $2.72 as that was the alternative
least burdensome to the defendant and all the contract
called for as far as the plaintiff was concerned.
The approval of this majority rule of damages for
breach of an alternative contract in Zalis v. Walter'1 would
seem to indicate that the Court of Appeals would not hesitate now to apply it in an appropriate case.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CLASSIFICATION BY
SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM
United States v. Embrey'
A petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed by a
mother to inquire into the detention of her son who had
been inducted into the military service under the Selective
Training and Service Act of 1940.2 The ground for complaint was that the mother was dependent on the son and
that the son should have been classified as 3-A instead of
1-A, and that accordingly her son's induction was premature. An order to show cause was allowed, setting a date
for a hearing. The respondents answered, reciting the
various formal proceedings before the Local Draft Board
and the appropriate Appeals Board. The evidence at the
hearing supported the answer (which also was not traversed) that there had been numerous hearings with reference to the appropriateness of the registrant's classification, and that he had been given and had exercised fully
his right to present his case before the Local Board, the
appropriate Appeal Board, and the National Headquarters,
resulting in his ultimate classification as 1-A and his induc"I The facts of the case reviewed in the text 8upra, circa n. 12 would seem
to be sufficient to have supported a holding that there was a contract. The
reasoning of the court overlooked the fact that the letter of the plaintiff
indicating an entry of the defendant's order, with the election open, might
have concluded a good alternative contract.
17 Supra, circa notes 1 and 2.
's Ibid.
46 F. Supp. 916 (D. C. Md., 1942).
2 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix Sec. 801 et seq.

